Today, we announce a substantial expansion of the Illinois Supreme Court database.  Matching the expansion earlier this year of the California Supreme Court database, the data on the Illinois Supreme Court has been expanded to include significantly more variables, as well as all the Court’s cases since January 1, 1990.  During that time, the Court has decided 1,352 civil cases and 1,519 criminal cases.  For the first half of our study period from 1990 through 2007, our database includes approximately 100 data points on each case.  From 2008 through 2016 – the period for which all of the Court’s oral arguments are on line -we have approximately 125 data points for each case.

The database now includes the entire time on the Court of every currently sitting Justice, plus many others:

Join us back here tomorrow as review the full list of variables in the new database.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Andrew Magill (no changes).

 

 

Yesterday, we began reviewing the Court’s county by county distribution of death penalty appeals, beginning in 1994.  Today, we will begin by reviewing the data from 2004 through 2010.

The Court decided only two death penalty appeals each year from 2004 through 2007.  In 2004, the Court decided one case in Cook and one case in Macon County.  In 2005, the Court decided one case each from Boone and Coles counties.  In 2006, the Court decided one case each from St. Clair and Stark counties.  In 2007, the Court decided one death penalty appeal from Cook County and one from Livingston county.  In 2008, the Court’s only death penalty case originated in Cook County.  In 2009, the Court decided three mandatory death penalty appeals – one each from Cook, Du Page and Will counties.  In 2010, the Court decided two death penalty cases from Cook County, one from Du Page county and one from Hancock county.

Now we turn our attention to the Court’s county-by-county reversal rates.

The Court affirmed one hundred percent of death penalty appeals from twenty different counties – Montgomery, Edgar, Jefferson, Clinton, Grundy, Iroquois, Livingston, Randolph, Stark, Coles, Macon, Douglas, Wayne, Macoupin, Winnebago, Stephenson, Bureau, Peoria and Fulton counties.

The Court affirmed 70.8% of the death penalty decisions from Cook County, 60% from Lake County, 64.29% from Du Page County, one quarter from Kankakee, half from Champaign, two thirds from Williamson and St. Clair, zero from Saline County, 75% from Madison County, two thirds from Hancock County, 42.86% from Will County, zero from Boone and Kane Counties, forty percent from Henry County, sixty percent from McLean County, zero from Whiteside and Cumberland counties, half from Mason County, and none from Rock Island County.

Join us back here next Tuesday as we continue our analysis of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision making.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Adam Jones (no changes).

This week, we continue our parallel look at automatic death penalty appeals here and over at our sister blog, the California Supreme Court Review.  Last week, we reviewed the Illinois Supreme Court’s year-by-year caseload from 1990 until the death penalty was abolished in this state.  This week, we’re going to take a look at where the cases came from, and determine whether death judgments from any particular county had a noticeably lower (or higher) affirmance rate than judgments from elsewhere.

In Table 533, we report the data for the years 1990 through 1993.  Cook County is far and away the largest single source of death penalty judgments each year.  In 1990, the Court decided thirteen death penalty cases from Cook County.  The Court decided one case from Lake County and one from Du Page.

In 1991, the Court decided seven death penalty appeals from Cook County.  The Court decided one case apiece from Du Page, Kankakee, Champaign, Williamson, Montgomery and Edgar counties.  In 1992, the Court decided thirteen death cases from Cook County.  The court heard one case each from Lake, Jefferson, Clinton, St. Clair, Grundy, Saline, Madison, Iroquois, Livingston and Randolph counties.  In 1993, the Court decided nine death cases from Cook County.  The Court also decided one case each from Montgomery, St. Clair, Macoupin and Winnebago counties.

We report the year-by-year data for the years 1994 through 1996 in Table 533.  In 1994, the Court heard nine death penalty appeals from Cook County, two from Livingston County, and one each from Lake, Du Page, St. Clair, Will, McLean, Cumberland and Mason counties.  In 1995, the Court decided nine death penalty appeals, two each from Du Page, Stephenson and Williamson counties, and one apiece from Will, Mason and Bureau counties.  In 1996, the Court decided ten death penalty appeals from Cook County, and one case each from Du Page, Champaign, Montgomery, Jefferson, Grundy, Madison, Will, Henry, Peoria and Rock Island counties.

In 1997, the Court decided six death penalty cases from Cook County, two cases each from Lake and Henry counties, and one each from Kankakee, Will, McLean and Whiteside counties.  In 1998, the Court decided a dozen death penalty cases from Cook County and one case each from Du Page, Madison, Will, Henry, McLean and Fulton counties.  In 1999, the Court decided only four death penalty appeals from Cook County.  The court heard one case each from Will and Wayne counties.  In 2000, the Court decided nine death penalty cases from Cook County, two cases each from Du Page and St. Clair counties, and one case each from Madison, Hancock, McLean and Douglas counties.  In 2001, the Court decided three death penalty appeals from Cook County and one case each from Du Page, Kankakee, Kane and McLean counties.  In 2002, the Court decided only one death penalty appeal from Cook County, and one each from Du Page, Hancock, Kane and Henry counties.  The following year, the Court decided two death penalty appeals from Cook County and one from Du Page County.

The Court decided only two death penalty appeals each year from 2004 through 2007.  In 2004, the Court decided one case each in Cook and Macon County.  In 2005, the Court decided one case each from Boone and Coles counties.  In 2006, the Court decided one case each from St. Clair and Stark counties.  In 2007, the Court decided one death penalty appeal from Cook County, and one from Livingston county.  In 2008, the Court’s only death penalty case originated in Cook County.  In 2009, the Court decided three mandatory death penalty appeals – one each from Cook, Du Page and Will counties.  In 2010, the Court decided two death penalty cases from Cook County, one from Du Page county and one from Hancock county.

Join us back here tomorrow as we continue our review of the Court’s death penalty appeals.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Kevin Dooley (no changes).

Yesterday, we began our comparative review of the Illinois and California Supreme Court’s experience with direct review of death penalty judgments.  Today, we reach the second half of our first analysis – how often did the Illinois Supreme Court reverse death judgments?

In Table 529, we report the reversal rate, divided into three classes – partial reversals where the Court either left the penalty in place or did not, and outright reversals.  In 1997 and 1998, the Court affirmed almost exactly the same fraction of its death penalty cases – 57.14% in 1997, 57.89% in 1998.  In 1997, the Court entered partial reversals vacating the penalty in 42.86% of its death penalty cases.  In 1998, the Court partially reversed leaving the penalty intact in 15.79% of its cases, and reversed outright in another 15.79%, while reversing and vacating the penalty in 10.53% of cases.

In 1999, the Court affirmed half of its death penalty cases.  The Court reversed outright in another third, and reversed in part leaving the penalty intact in 16.67%.  In 2000, as death penalty cases began to get quite rare, the Court affirmed in 64.71% of cases.  The Court partially reversed vacating the penalty and reversed outright in 17.65% of its cases each.  In 2001, the Court affirmed in 42.86% of cases, and reversed in part vacating the penalty in another 42.86%.  The Court reversed outright in 14.29%.  In 2002, the Court affirmed and completely reversed in the same forty percent each of the cases.  The Court reversed in part vacating the penalty in another 20%.  In 2003, the Court affirmed all three of the death penalty cases it heard.

In Table 530, we review the total number of death penalty decisions in the closing years of this state’s experience with the death penalty.  The Court decided two death penalty cases each in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007.  In 2008, it decided only one, but in 2003, it decided three.  Finally, in 2010, the Court decided the final four cases of its experience with death penalty cases.

We review the reversal rates for these final years below.  In 2004 and 2005, the Court’s two decisions per year were evenly split – one complete affirmance and one complete reversal.  In each year between 2006 and 2008, the Court affirmed outright in every death penalty case.  In 2009, the Court affirmed one third, reversed in part vacating the penalty in another third, and reversed outright in the remaining one third of the cases.  Finally, in 2010, the Court affirmed outright in three of the four death penalty cases, reversing in part while leaving the penalty intact in another case.

Join us at the California Supreme Court Review as we begin our review of that Court’s death penalty experience, and next Tuesday as we continue our exploration of Illinois cases.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Matt Maldre (no changes).

This week, we begin a dual project on the Illinois Supreme Court Review and the California Supreme Court Review – comparing the two states’ experience with automatic appeals of death penalty verdicts.

Illinois has had a tumultuous recent history with death penalty verdicts.  Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium on executions in 1999, citing concern that the system was condemning the innocent.  Governor Ryan commuted more than 160 death sentences in 2003 to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.  But it wasn’t until 2011 that Governor Pat Quinn finally signed the bill abolishing the death penalty once and for all – making Illinois the 16th state to end the death penalty.

During the era when Illinois had the death penalty, all death sentences were automatically appealed directly to the state Supreme Court.  In Table 526 below, we track the year-by-year number of death sentence opinions handed down by the Supreme Court.  In 1990, the Court decided fifteen death cases.  In 1991, the total was down to 13.  The following year, the number spiked to 23, but the Court then decided 13 in 1993 and 17 in 1994.  In 1995, the Court decided 18 death penalty cases. In 1996, the Court decided twenty cases.

In Table 527, we report the reversal rate for the death penalty cases, divided into three categories: partial reversals with the death penalty left in place; partial reversals with the death penalty reversed; and complete reversals.

In 1990, only 46.67% of death cases resulted in a complete affirmance.  Partial reversals with the death penalty vacated accounted for another 13.33% of the cases, and forty percent of the cases resulted in a complete reversal.  In 1991, 84.62% of cases were completely affirmed.  The Court vacated the penalty in partial reversals for 15.38% of the cases.  In 1992, complete reversals were back down to 56.52% of the cases.  The Court partially reversed leaving the penalty in place in 13.04% of the cases, and partially reversed vacating the penalty in another 17.39%.  The Court reversed outright in 13.04% of the death penalty decisions.

In 1993, the Court affirmed in 69.23% of cases.  The Court partially reversed vacating the penalty in 15.38%, partially reversed leaving the penalty in placed in 7.69%, and completely reversed 7.69% of the time.  In 1994, only 58.82% of the Court’s cases were completely affirmed.  Partial reversals with penalty vacated and complete reversals were tied at 17.65% of the cases apiece.  The Court partially reversed leaving the penalty in place in 5.88% of its decisions.  In 1995, the Court affirmed outright in 72.22% of its death cases.  The Court reversed outright 22.22% of the time, and partially reversed, vacating the penalty, in another 5.56%.  Finally, in 1996, the Court affirmed outright in 55% of cases.  The Court partially reversed affirming the penalty in 20%, partially reversed vacating the penalty 10% of the time, and reversed outright in 15% of cases.

We review the declining number of death penalty opinions for the years 1997 through 2003 in Table 528.  The Court decided fourteen cases in 1997 and nineteen in 1998.  The number dipped to six in 1999 before increasing to 17 in 2000.  From that time through the 2011 abolition, the number of death penalty decisions was down continuously.  IN 2001, the Court decided only seven cases.  In 2002, the Court decided five death penalty cases, and in 2003, only three.

Join us back here tomorrow as we continue our review of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Kevin Dooley (no changes).

 

Yesterday, we began our review of the Court’s experience with recusals in criminal cases.  Today, we conclude our review with a look at the most recent years.

First, let’s look at the importance of recusals in criminal cases for the years 2006 through 2011 – how often did recusals end up with the prevailing party having only four votes – the Constitutional minimum?  In 2006, the prevailing party had six votes in six criminal recusal cases.  Twice, the winner had five votes, and three times, four votes.  In 2007, recusals had little impact – all three times, the winner had six votes.  There were no recusals in criminal cases in 2008.  In 2009, the winning party had six votes in the only criminal recusal.  In 2010, the winning party had six votes three times, and four votes once.  Finally, in 2011, the prevailing party had six votes three times.

Recusals in criminal cases have been extremely rare in recent years.  In 2012, there was only one – Justice Thomas in one case.  In 2013, Justice Burke recused once and Justice Theis once.  There have been no recusals at all in criminal cases since 2013.

In 2012, the prevailing party in the single recusal case had six votes.  In 2013, the prevailing party had six votes in both criminal recusal cases.

Join us back here next Tuesday as we turn to a new topic – the Court’s experience with death penalty cases.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Esther Westerveld (no changes).

Last week, we tracked the Court’s experience, year by year, with recusals in civil cases.  Recusals are potentially a serious issue in Illinois Supreme Court practice, since there’s no provision for replacing recused Justices with pro tem Justices, and there must be four votes for the Court to decide the case.

This week, we turn our attention to the Court’s experience with recusals in criminal cases.  We would expect recusals to be at least a bit more uncommon in criminal than in civil cases, since one of the primary sources of recusal – a Justice having a financial or personal relationship with a party – is much less likely.  So what do the numbers look like?

In 2000, Justice Rathje recused in three criminal cases.  Justice Bilandic recused twice, and Justices McMorrow and Miller recused once apiece.  The following year, the new Justice Garman recused in thirteen criminal cases, and that’s it – no other Justices recused in criminal cases that year.  In 2002, new Justice Rarick recused in ten criminal cases.  Justice Thomas recused twice, and Justices Garman and Fitzgerald recused once apiece in criminal cases.  In 2003, once again Justice Rarick recused in ten criminal cases.  Justice Garman recused once.  In 2004, Justices Karmeier and Fitzgerald recused three times each in criminal cases.  Justices Freeman and Garman recused in two criminal cases apiece.  In 2005, Justice Bilandic recused in seven criminal cases.  Justice Freeman recused once.

In 2000, the prevailing party in criminal recusal cases received six votes once.  The prevailing party recused five votes twice, and the prevailing party received four votes – the minimum necessary for a decision – three times.  In 2001, recusals had less importance.  Seven times, the prevailing party had dix votes.  Five times, the winner had five votes, and once, the prevailing party had four votes.  In 2002, once again the prevailing party in criminal recusal cases had six votes seven times.  The prevailing party had five votes in four cases, and three times, the prevailing party had four votes.  In 2003, the prevailing party had six votes five times, five votes three times and four votes twice.  In 2004, recusal cases were more important, as the prevailing party had four votes four times.  Twice, the winning side had six cases and once, the winner had five votes.  In 2005, the prevailing party had six votes seven times, and four votes only once.

In Table 523, we report the recusals between 2006 and 2011.  In 2006, new Justice Burke recused in eight criminal cases.  Justice Karmeier recused three times, and Justices Garman and Kilbride recused once each.  In 2007, Justice Burke recused in three criminal cases, and there were no other recusals.  There were no recusals at all in criminal cases in 2008.  In 2009, there was only one – Justice Burke, once.  In 2010, Justices Burke, Kilbride, Karmeier and Fitzgerald recused in one criminal case each.  In 2011, new Justice Theis recused in three criminal cases, the only recusals of the year.

Join us back here tomorrow as we wrap up our brief excursion into the Court’s experience with recusals.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Roman Boed (no changes).

 

Yesterday, we began reviewing the data regarding the Court’s experience with recusals in civil cases, and how often recusals lead to the Court being closely divided in its decision.  Today, we proceed to Part 2 of our analysis – the years 2006 through 2017.

In Table 518, we review the number of votes for the prevailing party in civil cases with at least one recusal between 2006 and 2011.  In 2006, nine civil recusal cases wound up with six votes for the winning party.  Six cases had five votes and five had four.  In 2007, once again, most recusal cases wound up with a clear winner – nine cases had six votes, five had five and three had four.  In 2008, things were a good bit closer.  Only four cases had six votes for the prevailing party.  Three had four votes, and two cases had five.  In 2009, five civil cases had six votes for the prevailing party.  Two had five votes, and two had four.  In 2010, three cases had six votes for the prevailing party.  Two had four and one had five.  Finally, in 2011, six civil cases had six votes for the prevailing party.  Three had five votes and none had four.

So we moved on to the years 2012 through 2017.

In 2012, Justice Thomas recused himself in two civil cases.  Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Karmeier and Theis had one recusal apiece.  The following year, Justices Burke and Thomas recused twice each, while Justices Kilbride and Theis recused once each.  In 2014 and 2015, recusals were quite rare in civil cases.  In 2014, Justice Burke recused once and Justice Karmeier recused once.  In 2015, Justice Thomas recused twice – that was all.  In 2016, Justice Karmeier recused in two civil cases, and Justices Burke, Freeman, Kilbride and Thomas recused once each.  So far in 2017, Justice Kilbride has recused in one civil case.

Finally, we turn to votes for the prevailing party.  In 2012, two civil cases resulted in five votes for the prevailing party.  Two cases had four votes and one had six.  In 2013, two cases each had six and five votes.  One had four.  In 2014, one case had five votes for the prevailing party.  In 2015, two cases had four votes.  In 2016, two cases each had six and five votes for the prevailing party.  In 2017, the one recusal resulted in six votes for the prevailing party.

Join us back here next Tuesday as we turn our attention to the Court’s experience with recusals in criminal cases.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Sergey Gabdurakhmanov (no changes).

 

Last week, we reviewed the Court’s experience with certified questions from the Seventh Circuit.  This week, we begin our look at a different question: the Court’s history with recusals.

Recusals are particularly important on the Illinois Supreme Court because unlike the other Court we follow, the California Supreme Court, there is no provision for replacing Justices who recuse.  Moreover, pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the state constitution, the Court can’t decide an issue without the affirmative votes of at least four Justices, so the more Justices who recuse, the more likely it becomes that the Court will be unable to make a decision at all – so recusals can be a high stakes matter in Illinois.  Justices recuse for any number of reasons: a financial or personal interest in a party, or cases which came before the Appellate Court where the Justice served before joining the Supreme Court.  Ultimately, anything that could reasonably cause people to question a Justice’s impartiality is potentially grounds for recusal.

In 2000, Justice Rathje led the Court, recusing in three civil cases.  Justices Miller, Freeman, Harrison and Bilandic recused in one case each.  In 2001, Justice Garman led, recusing in five civil cases.  Justice Thomas recused three times, and Justices McMorrow, Freeman and Harrison recused once each.  In 2002, Justice Rarick – new to the Court, and therefore with several pending cases from his old court – recused nine times.  Justice Garman recused in three cases, Justices McMorrow and Freeman recused in two cases each, and Justices Kilbride, Thomas, Harrison and Fitzgerald in one case apiece.  In 2003, Justice Rarick recused in fifteen civil cases.  Justices McMorrow and Thomas recused once each.  In 2004, Justices Garman and Kilbride recused once apiece, and Justices McMorrow, Freeman, Thomas and Fitzgerald recused once.  Finally, in 2005, new Justice Karmeier recused in six cases, Justice Thomas recused four times, and Justices Garman, Freeman and Kilbride recused once each.

In Table 516, we review the vote totals for the prevailing party – given the four-votes-to-a-decision constitutional requirement, an important measure of whether recusals make a difference in the result.  Generally, the answer is no.  In 2000, cases with at least one recusal got six votes four times.  Recusal cases got four votes twice and five votes once.  In 2001, ten recusal cases received six votes, and one got five votes.  In 2002, ten cases got six votes, five got five and two got four.  In 2003, thirteen cases got six votes in recusal cases.  Three got five votes and two got four.  In 2004, seven cases got six votes and one got four.  Finally, in 2005, eleven cases wound up with the prevailing party getting six votes.  Three got five votes and three got four.

And finally, we turn in Table 517 to the years 2006-2011.  In 2006, new Justice Burke recused in fourteen civil cases.  Justice Thomas recused seven times.  Justice Garman recused three times and Justices Freeman and Karmeier once each.  In 2007, Justice Burke led, recusing eight times.  Justice Thomas recused seven times.  Justices Freeman and Kilbride recused four times apiece, and Justices Karmeier and Fitzgerald recused one time each.  In 2008, Justice Burke recused in four civil cases.  Justice Thomas recused three times, Justices Kilbride and Fitzgerald twice each, and Justice Freeman once.  In 2009, Justices Burke and Freeman recused three times apiece.  Justice Thomas recused in two civil cases, and Justices Kilbride and Fitzgerald recused once each.  In 2010, Justice Thomas was the only member of the Court recusing in more than one civil case – he had two recusals.  Justices Burke, Garman, Freeman, Kilbride and Karmeier recused once apiece.  Finally, in 2011, new Justice Theis recused four times.  Justice Kilbride recused three times.  Justices Freeman, Thomas and Karmeier each recused once.

Join us back here tomorrow as continue our look at the Court’s history with recusals.

Image courtesy of Pixabay by MonicaVolpin (no changes).

Yesterday, we looked at the small number of certified appeals the Court has decided since the late 1990s.  Since 1997, the Court has heard only eight certified question appeals from the Seventh Circuit – nearly all of them originating in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  Today, we look at a related question.  One would expect that cases which the Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court would have consider disagreement.  So how evenly divided do certified question appeals tend to be?

The certified question appeals were not significantly more divided than the rest of the Court’s docket.  Three of eight cases certified to the Supreme Court resulted in unanimous decisions.  One had a single dissenter.  One quarter of the Court’s certified question caseload ended in two-dissenter decisions, and another quarter ended in 4-3 decisions.

Four of the Court’s eight certified question appeals involved government entities as parties – a bigger fraction than the Court’s overall caseload.  Two more involved questions of public law: one involving the question of whether the Personnel Code created an implied cause of action, and another that turned on the scope of the Illinois Commerce Commission’s jurisdiction.  The remaining two cases involved widely applicable questions of tort law: the scope of the economic loss rule and the applicable statute of limitations for property damage in strict liability actions.

Join us back here next Tuesday as we turn our attention to a new area of the Court’s decision making.

Image courtesy of Pixabay by tpsdave (no changes).